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Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction
Demands for a reform of the law of armed conflict are often justified byclaiming that the “novel” phenomenon of asymmetric warfare has proven
the inadequacy of that body of law. Allegedly, the law of armed conflict is charac-
terized by a post-Westphalian approach, that is, its underlying concept is one of
symmetric warfare between belligerents that will abide by its rules only because
they expect their opponent to also abide (the principle of reciprocity). In asymmet-
ric warfare reciprocity is said to have become obsolete and the allegedly “new”
threats brought about by that “novel” phenomenon call for an adaptation of the
law of armed conflict.
It will be shown in this article that asymmetric warfare is far from being unprec-
edented, and that either the law of armed conflict has been adapted to address past
forms of asymmetric warfare or, in other instances, adaptation has been unneces-
sary despite the asymmetries. Accordingly, the calls for “new” law, if not un-
founded, are, at a minimum, premature. It is conceded, however, that it has
become increasingly difficult to cope with certain forms of asymmetry; therefore it
is of the utmost importance to develop strategies that enable States and their armed
forces to adequately respond to asymmetric warfare.
Finally, this article will focus on situations of armed conflict, whether of an inter-
national or of a non-international character. Cross-border—or so-called spillover—
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effects in a non-international armed conflict neither change the character of the
armed conflict nor pose insurmountable problems.1 If, for instance, non-State actors
engaged in a non-international armed conflict seek refuge in a neighboring State,
this does not necessarily mean that they will be immune from attack.
There may be situations, however, that do not qualify as an armed conflict even
though armed forces are engaged in military operations against “asymmetric actors.”
While the law of armed conflict will not be applicable in such circumstances, this
does not mean that public international law is silent on the matter. For instance,
counter-piracy operations are governed by the law of the sea or, as in the case of
piracy off the coast of Somalia, by applicable UN Security Council resolutions.2
Very often international human rights law—though contained in a regional con-
vention—will play an important role.3 Counterterrorism operations may also be
based on UN Security Council resolutions or on the inherent right of self-defense.4
It needs to be emphasized with regard to the latter, however, that States have not
yet agreed upon the criteria that give rise to the right. Because of the variety of re-
gimes that may be applicable, the armed forces deployed to counterterrorism oper-
ations all too often lack the legal clarity and legal security that are of vital
importance for the success of contemporary military operations.
I. Forms of Asymmetric Warfare
Some of the past efforts to define asymmetric warfare have not been very helpful in
identifying the underlying problems. For instance, asymmetric warfare used to be
defined as “a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and eco-
nomic resources.”5 In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the definition has
been modified. Asymmetric warfare is now defined by one author as “leveraging
inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior
opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining [the op-
ponent’s] will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives.”6
While this definition has the advantage of not being limited to inter-State armed
conflicts, it has not added much, insofar as almost all armed conflicts have been
asymmetric.
Asymmetries in warfare include asymmetries of power, means, methods, organi-
zation, values and time.7 Asymmetry can be participatory, technological, normative,
doctrinal or moral.8 In that sense, wars have always been characterized by at least
one form of asymmetry. For instance, any armed conflict involving the United
States will by definition be asymmetric because of the technological superiority of
the US armed forces. The same holds true for any armed conflict involving non-
State actors, be they partisans, resistance fighters, rebels or terrorists. Moreover, it
464
Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
must not be forgotten that in any war or armed conflict there is a considerable
element of surprise that makes it impossible to predict its course or outcome. The
enemy may employ methods, strategies or tactics not envisaged and that aim at the
opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetry, therefore, is not a “novel” phenomenon as
some would characterize it but an intrinsic characteristic of any war.9
It therefore seems that the term “asymmetric warfare,” which is by no means a le-
gal term of art, is nothing but a description of a fact of life. In this context, it is,
however, important to bear in mind that warfare, particularly in Western societies,
is perceived from a post-Westphalian perspective—that is, as armed hostilities
predominantly conducted under State control and between combatants in which
civilians and civilian objects are largely spared from violence and destruction.
From the outset of its development in the middle of the nineteenth century, the
modern law of armed conflict has been based on that approach. It must also be
noted that, to a certain extent, the law of armed conflict recognizes—or implicitly
accepts—the different forms of asymmetry. Still, the law’s underlying concept is
that of symmetric warfare in which the use of force is limited to lawful targets and is
premised on the belief that the parties to the conflict will abide by its rules.
The development of the law of armed conflict has resulted in abolishing the
prevalence of military necessity over considerations of humanity (“Kriegsräson geht
vor Kriegsmanier”) by establishing an operable balance between the two that, while
placing limits on the means and methods of war, does not make warfare impossi-
ble.10 This approach has been, still is and will continue to be challenged by the con-
duct of hostilities in contemporary armed conflicts that are characterized by an
increasingly structured and systematic deviation from the law. There is a growing
“tendency for the violence to spread and permeate all domains of social life. This is
because the weaker side uses the community as a cover and a logistical base to con-
duct attacks against a superior military apparatus.”11 Hence, in asymmetric
warfare,
the weaker party, recognizing the military superiority of its opponent, will avoid open
confrontation that is bound to lead to the annihilation of its troops and to defeat. In-
stead it will tend to compensate its inadequate arsenal by employing unconventional
means and methods and prolonging the conflict through an undercover war of attri-
tion against its well-equipped enemy.12
In summary, the term “asymmetric warfare” is to be understood as applying to
armed hostilities in which one actor/party endeavors to compensate for its mili-
tary, economic or other deficiencies by resorting to the use of methods or means of
warfare that are not in accordance with the law of armed conflict (or of other rules
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of public international law). It is important to stress that the motives or strategic
goals of asymmetric warfare, while important to understand, are irrelevant from a
legal point of view. Finally, the definition of asymmetric warfare here proposed
does not mean that other forms of asymmetries are neglected.
II. Applying the Lex Lata
It needs to be emphasized from the outset that the law of armed conflict has never
been modified with a view to compensate for technological dissimilarities between
the parties to the conflict. For instance, Russia and the United Kingdom endeavored
to outlaw the submarine as a means of naval warfare because it posed a consider-
able threat to their superior surface forces. Those efforts were in vain.13 Develop-
ments in weapons technology have at best been an incentive for a modification of
the law with a view to meeting humanitarian considerations.14 (Although there are
times when one cannot avoid the impression that humanitarian considerations are
a pretextual argument for the true intention of abolishing war through the laws of
war (correctly characterized as “lawfare”15).)
On the other hand, the law of armed conflict has been adapted to address certain
forms of participatory asymmetries. For instance, many of the atrocities commit-
ted during the Second World War were justified as legitimate responses to the con-
duct of asymmetric warfare by the opposing belligerent, inter alia, by partisan
attacks. That led to the killing of hostages and other innocent civilians, or to the
wanton destruction of villages in territory occupied or under the control of the
German Wehrmacht. The law of armed conflict has been progressively developed
in order to eliminate such conduct in future armed conflicts.
Hence, the law of armed conflict accepts asymmetries in warfare, be they tech-
nological or doctrinal, and it reacts to such asymmetries only if there is a necessity
of preserving minimum standards of humanity or of “alleviating as much as possi-
ble the calamities of war.”16 Moreover, the law of international armed conflict aims
to maintain the public character of warfare by indirectly reserving the right to harm
the enemy to a privileged group of actors.17
Normative and Moral Asymmetries
Normative and moral asymmetries, while sometimes posing considerable political
and/or operational problems, are, in principle, irrelevant from the perspective of
the law of international armed conflict.
This especially holds true with regard to the legality or illegality of the resort to
the use of armed force under the jus ad bellum. According to the principle of equal
application, the law of international armed conflict applies to every situation
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amounting to an international armed conflict irrespective of the political or strate-
gic goals pursued and irrespective of the legality of the resort to armed force by ei-
ther of the belligerents.18 Therefore moral or normative asymmetries are, in
principle, irrelevant, although they may have considerable political and strategic
impact.
This also holds true for a resort to the use of armed force authorized or mandated
by the UN Security Council. As emphasized in the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bul-
letin, the “fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law . . .
are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they
are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of
their engagement.”19
Moreover, the causes for a resort to the use of armed force have no impact on the
scope of applicability of the law of armed conflict. There have been suggestions that
military operations aiming at the protection of human rights are governed by
stricter legal limitations than “regular” armed conflicts.20 State practice, such as in
the context of the Kosovo campaign, provides insufficient evidence to establish
that such suggestions have a basis in existing law.21
Other normative asymmetries may have an impact on the law of armed conflict.
Such normative asymmetries occur if the parties to an international armed conflict
are not bound by the same treaties. As in general international law, law of armed
conflict treaties only apply to States parties unless a State not party to a given treaty
expressly accepts and applies it.22 Absent such a declaration, the hostilities will only
be governed by customary international (humanitarian) law.
Treaties do not, however, become inapplicable if members of an alliance are not
bound by the same treaties. The ensuing potential interoperability problems, that
is, States within an alliance operating under different legal obligations, are often
solved by a “matrix” solution. Thus, if a certain task involves conduct that would
violate a treaty obligation of some alliance members, the force commander will en-
trust that task to units of States not bound by the treaty restrictions. The legality of
such conduct has been recognized by Article 21(3) of the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions, which provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1
of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their
military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and opera-
tions with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities pro-
hibited to a State Party.”23 Finally, States may differ on the interpretation of a treaty
by which they are equally bound or of a rule of customary international humani-
tarian law. Again, the problem of interoperability is very often solved by either
national caveats or by other procedural safeguards, such as the “matrix” solution.
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Asymmetric Actors (Participatory Asymmetries)
It has been rightly stated that one of the characteristics of asymmetric warfare (as
understood here) is that the “dividing line between combatants and civilians is
consciously blurred and at times erased.”24 This inevitably results in attacks against
the civilian population and individual civilians, or even in conduct amounting to
prohibited perfidy. Such conduct is far from new. The existing law of armed con-
flict is based on the experience of past armed conflicts and has, in principle, pre-
served the general distinction between protected civilians on the one hand and, on
the other hand, persons who, either as combatants or as members of organized
armed groups or as civilians, take a direct part in hostilities.
International Armed Conflict
Unfortunately, the adaptation of the law of international armed conflict to the
changed realities of war has not always been satisfactory. This especially holds true
for Article 44(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I), which diminishes the obliga-
tion of combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.25 That
provision does not constitute customary international law and its scope of applica-
bility is limited to situations of “internationalized armed conflicts” in the sense of
Article 1(4) of the Protocol.26 However, it certainly provides a degree of protection
to members of organized armed groups who intentionally disregard its minimum
requirements.27
Apart from that, the law of international armed conflict is rather clear: persons
directly participating in the hostilities who qualify neither as combatants nor as
members of any of the other privileged groups28 do not enjoy combatant immunity
or, when captured by the enemy, prisoner of war status. As far as civilians are con-
cerned, this has been expressly recognized by Article 51(3), AP I: “Civilians shall
enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.” Of course, the exact meaning and scope of the concept
of direct participation in hostilities is far from settled.29 The same holds true with
regard to the legal status of civilians directly participating in hostilities. Some con-
tinue to consider them as civilians protected under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion30 who may, however, be attacked (for such time they are directly participating
in hostilities) and punished for their conduct.31 Others consider them “unlawful
combatants” who are protected by neither the Third Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war nor the Fourth Geneva Convention.32
The law of international armed conflict provides a rather elaborate set of rules
responding to participatory asymmetry and offers an operable solution to most of
the problems encountered in recent international armed conflicts. While there is
no prohibition of entrusting persons other than combatants with the commission
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of acts harmful to the enemy, those persons not enjoying combatant immunity di-
rectly participating in hostilities must understand that they enjoy no protection
under the law of armed conflict beyond the minimum standards laid down in Arti-
cle 75 of AP I and in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Accordingly, members of organized armed groups that do not belong to a party
to an international armed conflict but who directly participate in hostilities do not
pose an insurmountable legal problem. They may either be considered as civilians
directly taking part in the hostilities, who, for the duration of their direct participa-
tion, are liable to attack and who may be prosecuted after capture, or, alternatively,
the organized armed group to which they belong is a party to a non-international
armed conflict that exists side by side with the international armed conflict. In the
latter instance, the members of such a group—at least if and as long as they per-
form a “continuous combat function” within the organized armed group33—are
legitimate targets who enjoy neither combatant immunity nor prisoner of war status
after capture.
Non-international Armed Conflicts
Non-international armed conflicts are asymmetric by nature, particularly if reg-
ular armed forces are engaged in hostilities against organized armed groups of
non-State actors. Since, however, the concept of “combatant” does not apply to
non-international armed conflicts the applicable law is not built on the legal status
of the actors. It is important to note in this context that the very existence of a non-
international armed conflict presupposes that there exists at least one organized
armed group engaging in armed hostilities against the government or against an-
other organized armed group. Hence, members of an organized armed group do
not qualify as civilians. This is widely accepted.34
There is, however, one unresolved issue relating to those members of an orga-
nized armed group who do not perform a “continuous combat function.” While
some prefer to consider them civilians,35 others are unwilling to differentiate ac-
cording to an individual’s function within the group.36 The least common denomi-
nator is that members of an organized armed group performing a “continuous
combat function” in a non-international armed conflict do not enjoy general pro-
tection and are liable to attack. Of course, the State party to a non-international
armed conflict is not prevented from prosecuting them if captured under its
domestic criminal law.
In non-international armed conflict civilians enjoy general protection. They
may lose that protection, however, if they deliberately decide to take a direct part in
the hostilities. Accordingly, Article 13(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II pro-
vides: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for
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such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” This is declaratory of customary
international law.37
Intentional Violations of the Law
Although not without difficulties, as has been shown, participatory and normative
asymmetries can be coped with under the existing law; however, the core of the
problem posed by asymmetric warfare is intentional violation of the law of armed
conflict by asymmetric actors.
General Aspects
Asymmetric actors in armed conflict either intentionally violate the principle of
distinction or endeavor to incite their opponent to act in violation of that “intrans-
gressible principle”38 of the law of armed conflict.
The law of armed conflict provides a rather clear response to any form of asym-
metric warfare that aims at blurring the principle of distinction, whether by way of
disguising as civilians, by abusing civilian objects for military purposes or by direct
attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians. Still, the problems in
practice persist. If it is not feasible to identify enemy combatants or members of en-
emy organized armed groups because they appear to be civilians, a decision not to
attack may result either in suicide or, even worse, in prohibited direct attacks
against the civilian population. Of course, combatants who do not distinguish
themselves properly when engaged in hostilities do not enjoy combatant immunity
or prisoner of war status when captured. While they may be prosecuted for their
conduct, this is considered by many military commanders to be an insufficient
response to their practical problems.
Similar problems exist with regard to the principle of proportionality. The law
of armed conflict does not prohibit attacks that result in the incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. Such “collateral damage” is
a violation of the law of armed conflict only if it is excessive (in contrast to “exten-
sive”) in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.39 In
view of that prohibition, and in view of the media’s attention to any civilian losses
in armed conflict, an asymmetric actor will seek either to provoke the opponent
into an attack causing excessive collateral damage or to make the public believe
that an attack has been disproportionate. Systematic violations of the principle of
distinction entail the considerable risk that the opponent applies different stan-
dards for the assessment of proportionality. “If such tactics are systematically em-
ployed for a strategic purpose, the enemy may feel a compelling and overriding
necessity to attack irrespective of the anticipated civilian casualties and damage.”40
Still, the prohibition on excessive collateral damage is clear. Considerations of
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military necessity do, of course, play an important part, especially with regard to
the determination of the anticipated military advantage. However, military neces-
sity as such does not justify a deviation from the well established humanitarian
standards of the law of armed conflict.41
Moreover, asymmetric actors will in many cases deliberately act contrary to
their obligation to take feasible precautions in attack, particularly by using civilians
or civilian objects as shields or by transferring military objectives into densely pop-
ulated areas. Despite the obvious illegality of such conduct, the opponent will be
prevented from attack if the attack is expected to result in excessive collateral dam-
age. Here the law of armed conflict itself introduces an element of asymmetry by
privileging unlawful conduct.
Finally, a further problem exists with regard to the obligation of the attacker to
do everything feasible to limit attacks to lawful targets and to avoid, if possible, and,
in any event, to minimize excessive collateral damage.42 It would go too far to con-
clude that parties to a conflict that possess advanced weapons systems are under an
absolute obligation to only make use of sophisticated and highly discriminating
weapons. The fact that such weaponry is available does not necessarily mean that
less sophisticated weapons may no longer be employed. Sophisticated and ad-
vanced weapons are expensive and they may, therefore, be reserved for attacks on
more important targets. It must be recognized, however, that
advanced militaries are held to a higher standard as a matter of law because more pre-
cautions are feasible for them. As the gap between “haves” and “have-nots” widens in
21st century warfare, this normative relativism will grow. In a sense, we are witnessing
the birth of a capabilities-based IHL regime.43
The consequence is that to a certain extent the standard of feasibility privileges the
weaker side of an armed conflict, thus adding another form of normative asymme-
try into the law of armed conflict.
Use of Prohibited Weapons
The law of armed conflict and arms control law, which are increasingly merging
into a single regime labeled “humanitarian arms control,” provide a well estab-
lished set of rules that either prohibit the use of certain weapons or restrict their use
in certain circumstances.44 In asymmetric warfare the weaker party may be in-
clined to disregard such prohibitions or restrictions and to justify a deviation by
citing the superiority of the opponent.45 Moreover, as pointed out by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, “it is evident that if one Party, in violation of
definite rules, employs weapons or other methods of warfare which give it an
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immediate, great military advantage, the adversary may, in its own defence, be in-
duced to retort at once with similar measures.”46 Such justifications have, however,
no basis in existing law. The fact that a party to an armed conflict is confronted
with a superior enemy does not justify the use of a means of warfare whose use is
prohibited under the law of international and non-international armed conflict.
Therefore, the threat of imminent defeat is not sufficient grounds for resorting to
the use of prohibited means of warfare.
Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advi-
sory opinion held that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the law of armed
conflict unless the “very survival of a State is at stake.”47 It is obvious that this hold-
ing may be improperly used to justify a violation of the rules and principles of the
law of armed conflict. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the Court’s finding
has no basis in the law of armed conflict. If the survival argument has any rele-
vance, it may be to the jus ad bellum.
Prohibited Methods of Warfare
One feature of asymmetric warfare is suicide bombings; another is the use of “hu-
man shields.” With regard to the former, it is important to note that the law of
armed conflict does not prohibit suicide attacks unless they are conducted by re-
sort to perfidious means and/or methods.48
The law is different with regard to the use of human shields. Article 51(7) of AP
I, in prohibiting the use of the “presence or movements of the civilian population
or individual civilians . . . to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to
shield, favor or impede military operations,” reflects customary international
law.49 The law of armed conflict provides a possible—though not undisputed—so-
lution to cope with the issue of human shields by distinguishing between voluntary
and involuntary human shields.
Civilians, whatever their motives, who voluntarily serve as human shields may
be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities for the duration of such participa-
tion, thereby losing their protected status under the law of armed conflict.50 De-
spite arguments to the contrary, involuntary human shields retain their status as
civilians.51 Accordingly, attacks against a shielded military objective will be prohib-
ited if the incidental losses among involuntary human shields are excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.52 It needs to be
emphasized in this context that
the appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military ad-
vantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that, by dint of the large (albeit
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involuntary) presence of civilians at the site of the military objective, the number of
civilian casualties can be expected to be higher than usual.53
However, the distinction between involuntary and voluntary human shields will,
in many cases, not provide an operable solution in practice because it is virtually
impossible to determine whether a person has deliberately and freely decided to
serve as a human shield or is being forced to so act.
Moreover, while the law of armed conflict may not prohibit a proportionate at-
tack against a shielded lawful target, it will prove a most difficult task to defend the
death of a considerable number of civilians politically. In asymmetric warfare, the
weaker party often consciously and systematically turns to the practice of using
human shields in order to exploit the political and moral dilemma in which the
attacker will find itself. Thus, while the law purports to offer a solution, in most in-
stances it will not assist in overcoming those dilemmas.
Preliminary Conclusions
Doubts have been expressed as to whether asymmetric warfare can “still be grasped
by and measured against the concept of military necessity, for the complexities and
intangibility of such scenarios escape its traditionally narrow delimitations.”54
These doubts particularly extend to responses to the actions of non-State actors
who intentionally and systematically deviate from well established standards of the
law of armed conflict. Their opponents may be induced to reemphasize consider-
ations of military necessity that may result either in a more liberal interpretation of
the law of armed conflict or in its irrelevance because it is considered an unfair ob-
stacle to the success of military operations.
Of course, reciprocity is an important factor in maintaining the continued ef-
fectiveness of the law of armed conflict. If one party to an armed conflict intention-
ally and systematically disregards its rules and principles in order to achieve a
military or political advantage, the opponent’s readiness to continue to comply
with the law may steadily decrease. There are, however, solutions to the problem.
On the one hand, the law of armed conflict is flexible enough to respond to an
asymmetric actor’s conduct. While it is true that such responses put a heavier bur-
den on the law-abiding party to the conflict, the values underlying the law of armed
conflict and the achievements of the past 150 years should not be given up too eas-
ily. While it is conceded that the growing asymmetries in warfare have the potential
of shaking the very bases of the law of armed conflict, this does not mean that there
is a need for an adaptation of the law to the “new realities” of armed conflict.
473
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:49 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
III. Possible Responses to Asymmetric Warfare
Although it must be admitted that complying with the law has become increasingly
difficult, the law of armed conflict provides solutions to the threats posed by the
current versions of asymmetric warfare. Moreover, the emergence of international
criminal law has added a further and quite powerful enforcement mechanism for
ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict. It may be questioned, how-
ever, whether non-State actors will understand that, despite their inferiority in
arms and military technology, they would ultimately profit from compliance with
the law of armed conflict. If intentional violations of the law are part and parcel of
an overall strategy, it would be quite naïve to believe that asymmetric actors would
be deterred from such violations by either lawful responses or criminal
proceedings.
For that reason, it is also doubtful whether “incentives” to non-State actors
would ultimately result in compliance with the law of armed conflict. Proposed
amnesties, reconciliation procedures, truth commissions and similar measures
have not necessarily proven to contribute to an increased effectiveness of the law of
armed conflict during active hostilities. In certain circumstances they may serve as
an operable tool to reestablish peace and security in post–armed conflict societies.
As reality shows, however, such steps have not prevented egregious atrocities from
occurring during armed conflicts. Additionally, the law of armed conflict is far too
important to be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Any form of impu-
nity would run counter to the very object and purpose of the law of armed
conflict—and of international criminal law.
Once faced with the challenge of responding to asymmetric warfare, States must
be prepared to invoke the law of armed conflict in two respects.
The first is strict application of the law vis-à-vis asymmetric actors. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, treating them as combatants. For instance, some States
respond to asymmetric threats by resorting to “targeted killings” (also labeled “ex-
trajudicial killings”) of individuals suspected of being involved in unlawful attacks
against government forces, civilians or civilian objects. It must be borne in mind
that under the law of armed conflict there is no general prohibition of targeted kill-
ings. If the targeted individual qualifies as a combatant, including as a member of
an organized armed group who is “performing a continuous combat function,” or
as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, he or she may be attacked. There is,
however, disagreement whether there is an obligation to rather capture than kill
the individual if that is a feasible alternative.55 Of course, the political price to be
paid is frequently considered to be too high, creating an unwillingness on the part
of many governments to consent (or resort) to targeted killings.
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Second and closely related to the first aspect, governments should be proactive
in explaining to the general public and to all concerned political actors their under-
standings of the law of armed conflict, both in general and in its application to a
given concrete situation. It is therefore important to have an up-to-date military
manual that reflects the current state of the law of armed conflict as it is understood
by the government. Given the adoption of new treaties, developments in custom-
ary international law and new interpretations of existing treaties, it is not sufficient
to simply publish a manual once; it must be updated to reflect changes in the law.
For instance, the manual of the German armed forces was published in 199256—
nearly two decades ago. Because it does not provide answers to legal questions aris-
ing, for instance, in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to identify the German government’s position on the current
state of the law of armed conflict. Consequently, it is rather easy for certain actors
pursuing a political agenda to claim that the German armed forces operating in
Afghanistan have violated the law.
In this context, it must not be forgotten that one feature of asymmetric warfare
is the use—or rather abuse—of the media and of public opinion. It is therefore
crucial to provide prompt and reliable information. The German armed forces, af-
ter an attack on Taliban fighters and two tanker trucks in September 2009, had to
learn in a quite painful manner that a time-consuming and unstructured investiga-
tion will fuel further speculation as to what actually occurred and will only assist
the enemy, either directly or indirectly.
The air attack on the trucks and the Taliban fighters who were in the immediate
vicinity was conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict. The fighters
were lawful targets because they were members of an organized armed group per-
forming a “continuous combat function.” Because there were reasonable grounds
for assuming that the trucks—and the fuel they carried—would be used for attacks
against civilians and International Security Assistance Force personnel, they had
become lawful military objectives by either their use or intended purpose. At the
time of the decision to attack the trucks and the Taliban fighters, the commanding
officer rightly relied on the information available to him.
The reconnaissance photographs showed about 70 individuals attempted to free
one of the trucks that had become stuck in a river. According to a human intelli-
gence source who had been very reliable in the past, the people surrounding the
trucks were Taliban fighters. Recognizing his obligations under the law of armed
conflict, the German officer who authorized the attack decided to only use two
five-hundred-pound bombs in order to spare a nearby farm and village. Shortly af-
ter the attack it was reported in some media reports that as many as 142 people had
been killed. In these initial reports, the statuses of the people allegedly killed or
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injured was uncertain; some spoke of “Taliban and civilians,” others of “predomi-
nantly civilian casualties.” Other reports stated that the majority of civilians killed
or injured were innocent persons from the nearby village who were only trying to
acquire fuel for their personal needs.
On April 16, 2010, the Office of the Public Prosecutor decided to dismiss all
criminal proceedings against the German officers involved. The report on which
that decision was based reveals that at the time of the attack there had been reason-
able grounds to assume that the individuals surrounding the trucks were Taliban.
While the public prosecutor could not rule out the presence of civilians, the report
indicated that if some were civilians, at least some of those had directly participated
in the hostilities. In any event, there was no convincing evidence of a large number
of civilian casualties. Even if there had been civilian casualties, the report contin-
ues, there would be no violation of the law of armed conflict because the incidental
losses and injuries were not excessive in relation to the military advantage antici-
pated. Unfortunately, the report was classified because it contained sensitive mili-
tary information. It was not until October 2010 that an unclassified version was
made available to the public. By that time public opinion had already been influ-
enced by unfounded allegations of violations of the law of armed conflict. The gen-
eral perception has not been altered since the release of the report because neither
the Office of the Public Prosecutor nor the Federal Ministry of Defence has
proactively disseminated it.
It is, of course, understood that thorough investigations are important in order
to be credible and in order to protect the members of the armed forces allegedly in-
volved in a violation of the law of armed conflict. Still, the media field should not be
left to those who, in disregard of their lack of information (and all too often exper-
tise), pursue their political ends by claiming violations of the law. A delayed gov-
ernment response will often be considered as evidence of secrecy.
History has shown that reports of national authorities entrusted with the inves-
tigation of alleged violations of the law of armed conflict by their own forces will in
many instances be received with suspicion; therefore States engaged in military oper-
ations should be prepared to entrust investigations to an independent fact-finding
entity whose functions are to conduct a thorough investigation and provide reli-
able and trustworthy information to government decisionmakers and the public.
In that regard, governments, whether Additional Protocol I formally applies or
not, should be encouraged to make use of the fact-finding commission under Arti-
cle 90, AP I, or, alternatively, agree on another investigatory body composed of
members of high political reputation.
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Conclusion
Asymmetric warfare clearly constitutes a challenge to the international legal order
and to its underlying values. While it does not justify a deviation from the well es-
tablished rules and principles of the law of armed conflict, it is necessary to
strengthen that law by all means available. Because asymmetric actors will not
abandon the options opened by a deliberate violation of the law of armed conflict,
incentives to non-State actors to bring about compliance will very often prove
futile. Despite the potential political implications, the application of military force
in accordance with the law of armed conflict is the first way to respond to the threats
posed by asymmetric warfare. This, however, must be accompanied by a proactive
and credible information policy. Additionally, thorough investigation/fact-finding
by a neutral and respected international commission of the actions of the non-
State actors would be an effective step that could contribute to repressing such
conduct.
A further step is criminal prosecution, under either domestic or international
criminal law, of those who violate the law. While some may object, often citing the
frequently heard cliché that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter,” holding accountable those who violate the law is the only promising ap-
proach to deterring those who choose to violate the law. Amnesties or reconcilia-
tion efforts may have proven successful in limited instances; it is doubtful,
however, whether they have had—or will have—a lasting effect. Rather, they may
prove to be an incentive for asymmetric actors to continue to pursue or even
increase their unlawful conduct.
These conclusions do not, however, relieve States from their obligation vis-à-vis
their armed forces to clarify the applicable law for situations not amounting to an
international or non-international armed conflict. Moreover, governments ought
to thoroughly scrutinize and evaluate the challenges posed by asymmetric warfare
and take the necessary measures to reduce their vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities—
whatever their nature—will always be an interesting target for asymmetric actors,
whether they are enemy States or non-State actors, e.g., terrorists.
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